Never the same again
There is a lot of unity among Senators and Congressmen for antagonistic policies towards China, whether it’s Biden’s CHIPS Act, or the most recent, Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA).
In dollar signs, TERA authorizes the US to co-finance purchases of US military equipment up to $2 billion a year for five years, and a $100 million-per-annum payment to create what the previous bill called a “war stockpile” but now calls a “regional contingency stockpile,” every year for 10 years.
Additionally, TERA grants $1 billion in Presidential drawdown authority which gives Biden or his successor the ability to transfer weapons directly to Taiwan from the Pentagon’s own stockpiles. Most of the military aid to Ukraine has arrived through this authority.
TERA is a version of the Taiwan Policy Act that was released by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Chairman Bob Menendez (D – NJ), that represented the largest restructuring of the relationship with Taiwan since the Nixon Administration.
It included elements, now struck from the final amendment, such as designating Taiwan a “major non-NATO ally” recognizing them as their own nation, more or less, allowing the open a proper embassy in D.C., and arranging a massive coordinated sanctions campaign in the event China attempts to reunify with Taiwan by force.
TERA, as passed, “still contains elements that reinforce the existing one-sided and almost purely militaristic approach to the Taiwan problem,” writes Michael Swaine, director of the Quincy Institute’s East Asia program, adding that Menendez’ claim that Taiwan is the “beating heart” of America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is dangerous.
This is because no amount of U.S. military deterrence and close relations with Taiwan will deter today’s much stronger China from resorting to war if it concludes that America is actively seeking to permanently separate Taiwan from China.
A policy of opposition to even peaceful unification is diametrically opposed to the One China policy (which accepts such the possibility of peaceful unification, and would thus give Beijing the incentive to entirely abandon its long-standing preference for peaceful unification).
It will likely change the relationship with China for the rest of the century, as every large arms sale to Taiwan has been seen as an interference in China’s internal affairs. These are interpreted as aggression and result in greater military preparedness, facilitating more arms sales until a situation like that under the Biden Administration arises where the One China policy is openly ignored, such as in Biden’s continual reiterations about a commitment to protecting Taiwan, and China removing language about peaceful reunification in their official Taiwan policy papers.
Stockpiling
One of the largest developments in national security direction under the new NDAA is the amendments overseeing a massive scaling up of American production capacity for munitions. The word on Capitol Hill and Crystal City is that the massive amounts of ammunition, rockets, and supplies sent to Ukraine have depleted US reserves, and that the expanded capacity will help continue this furnishing, and replenish what has already been given.
“As the United States continues to lead the global military aid response to Ukraine amid Putin’s unprovoked war, it has become increasingly critical that we simultaneously ensure the sustainment of our defensive weapons stockpile while also providing the materials our allies and partners need to defend themselves,” said Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D – NH).
“Lethal aid provided to Ukraine has diminished U.S. stockpiles and left defense contractors with uncertainty on timing and orders for backfill, negatively affecting their ability to quickly ramp up production,” said Senator Thom Tillis (R – NC).
Jeremy Scahill, writing for The Intercept called such claims “a parlor game”.
“There is no actual shortage of defensive weapons in the U.S. The “stockpile” is based on U.S. war-gaming theory and preparation for various imagined future wars and simultaneous campaigns,” writes Scahill.
$2.7 billion has been allocated to increasing domestic production capacity, while $4 billion has gone to just five companies: Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, General Dynamics, Northrup Gruman, and Boeing under a new system of no-bid, multiyear contract distribution—something these companies have always wanted—for munitions stockpiling, including comical numbers of things like Stinger anti-air missiles, Javelin anti-tank missiles, HIMAR rockets, and the Multiple Launch Rocket system; Arken explains why.
A particularly interesting — and potentially troubling — section of the bill is the one entitled “Temporary Authorizations Related to Ukraine and Other Matters.” If bought in the quantities authorized, the weapons listed in this section would require a permanent expansion of U.S. weapons manufacturing capability. And once the new factories exist, there will be pressure to keep them open in perpetuity, at a cost of untold billions of dollars.
742 HIMARS rocket systems, 20,000 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, 25,000 Javelin anti-tank missiles, and more. By contrast, the United States has so far supplied Ukraine with 38 HIMARS, 1,400 Stingers, and 8,500 Javelins. If even a portion of these authorized systems are funded, it will dramatically expand U.S. weapons production capacity.
Arken’s detail about the new factories is telling, since an additional $45 billion was added to the NDAA all to buy weapon systems, vehicles, and munitions not asked for or needed by the Pentagon, often specifically in districts controlled by Armed Services committee members.
The bill will now move to the Senate, where it’s already cleared committee along negotiated lines briefly detailed. WaL
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